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Author: Porcher L. Taylor III, J.D., SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES 
 
Senator and presidential contender John Kerry has loudly and critically clanged the intelligence-
reform bell in President Bush's ears. Recently, Mr. Kerry proposed great expansion of the director of 
central intelligence's (DCI) authority over the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency 
and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. But true reform must first come with the DCI's 
emancipation from the White House through providing a 10-year term as a presidential appointee. 
 
Mr. Kerry and Mr. Bush owe it to the nation to "agree" before the November election on a "new" 
central intelligence director who would serve a 10-year term. Likewise, the Senate should confirm 
the "new" DCI before the election. This is the only way the nation and the world could see firsthand 
the U.S. is genuinely committed putting intelligence analysis above even the appearance of politics. 
 
This would be a refreshing and unprecedented display of pre-Election Day bipartisanship that would 
help both candidates and be hailed by the nation. Indeed, restoring congressional, public and 
international trust and confidence in the quality and adequacy of Langley's intelligence ledger is an 
imperative of the first order. Such a move might also turbo-charge low morale in the intelligence 
community. 
 
The case for a 10-year term DCI is quite compelling. For some of the same reasons of political 
independence that the FBI director serves a 10-year term and governors of the Federal Reserve 
System serve 14-year terms, the time has come for future DCIs to no longer serve at the president's 
pleasure. Even the semblance of politicized law enforcement, monetary policy or intelligence is 
anathema to a constitutional democracy. 
 
All would agree that federal law enforcement - especially in the post-September 11, 2001, era - must 
be above the political fray. 
 
Since 1976, FBI directors have served for one term, not to exceed 10 years. Congress chose a 10-
year term in re-engineering director tenure to insulate the bureau from the inevitability of partisan 
politics. Evidently, a director can only be removed for cause, i.e., evidence of wrongdoing. 
 
The legislative goal was to avoid changing FBI directors and presidents simultaneously. This 
legislative move was a dramatic rebuke to the 48-year infamous rein of abuse of J. Edgar Hoover, 
FBI director from 1924 until his death in 1972. 
 
While some anxiety might exist among some members of Congress that a 10-year term would be 
too long for a mediocre or failure-prone DCI, a DCI could always voluntarily opt to leave before the 
end of the 10-year term. 
 
Consider the surprise retirement of FBI Director Louis Freeh in 2001, after only eight years of his 10-
year term. Mr. Freeh's watch at the FBI was plagued by high-profile controversies. Intense media 
attacks on Mr. Freeh's leadership might have contributed to his early exit. 
 Mr. Freeh's sudden departure afforded President Bush the opportunity to nominate Robert Mueller 
as FBI director. The Senate confirmed Mr. Mueller, and he was sworn in just a week before the 
September 11 attacks. 
 
All would agree that the formulation and setting of monetary policy must be above the political fray. 
Congress created the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, in the 
wake of the calamitous Panic of 1907, which resulted from failure of a major New York bank, 
triggering a ripple effect of bank failures. 
 
Through statutory evolution, the Fed Board has evolved into a federal regulatory body with unrivaled 
structural and institutional freedom and insulation from political influence and the political process. 
 
The president, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the board of governors of the 
Federal Reserve System to 14-year terms, and its members are removable only for cause. The 
terms of Fed Board members are staggered so one of the seven members' terms expires every two 
years. This allows a president who serves only a single term the opportunity to appoint only two Fed 
Board members. 
 
The Fed chairman, a member of the board, is appointed for a four-year term. The term of Fed 
members is the longest of any federal agency - congressional acknowledgement of the primary 
importance of monetary policy being free of "a majority of special interests." 
 
Indeed, Congress intended the Fed to exercise its extraordinary control over monetary policy in a 
manner that represents the "general public interest." Truly, monetary policy and political correctness 
are antipodal universes. 
 
Intelligence assessments and political correctness are antipodal universes, too. Only when this is 
recognized can the intelligence community make the tough calls in those very hard cases like 
determining rogue nations' ambitions for weapons of mass destruction. 
 
Now is the time, drawing upon advantages of the political independence of the FBI director and 
Federal Reserve Board, for Congress to legislate a 10-year term for the director of central 
intelligence. Mr. Kerry and Mr. Bush owe it to the nation to set this in motion now. 
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